

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

INRE-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 H-03 INR-11 IO-14 L-03 NSAE-00

OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-03

SS-20 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-07 DODE-00 DRC-01 AECE-00

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O R 251520Z SEP 74

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5272

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY ROME

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 15179

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MBFR, PARM, GW

SUBJECT: MBFR: INITIAL FRG REACTION TO USG ANALYSIS OF
VERIFICATION PROPOSAL

REF: STATE 202156

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BEGIN SUMMARY: FRG DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER ROTH GAVE

THE INITIAL REACTION TO THE USG ANALYSIS OF THE GERMAN VERIFICATION PROPOSAL ON SEPT 24. ROTH SAID THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEM IN THE VERIFICATION ISSUE REMAINS THAT OF FINDING A SOLUTION WHICH IS POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE. ROTH BELIEVES ONLY MOVEMENTS INTO THE NGA SHOULD BE CONTROLLED, WITH PRE-NOTIFICATION THE KEY TO THE WHOLE SYSTEM. ROTH CITED THE IMPORTANCE WHICH STATISTICAL ANALYSES COULD PLAY IN A VERIFICATION SYSTEM WHICH, WHEN COUPLED WITH SPOT CHECKS, MIGHT RESULT IN A SYSTEM WHICH WOULD PREVENT CHEATING IN QUANTITY. ROTH THINKS THE IDEA OF ESTABLISHING A VERIFICATION BODY SUCH AS A STANDING MULTILATERAL COMMISSION SHOULD BE EXPLORED FURTHER. END SUMMARY

1. EMBOFF MET WITH FRG DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER ROTH AND FONOFF VERIFICATION OFFICE DIRECTOR HAUBER ON SEPT 24 TO DISCUSS REACTION TO THE USG ANALYSIS CONTAINED IN REFTEL.

ROTH BEGAN THE DISCUSSION BY EXPRESSING HIS GRATITUDE FOR THE EXTENSIVE WORK DONE BY THE USG ON THE GERMAN PAPER. HE SAID HE DID NOT FIND ANYTHING PARTICULARLY NEW IN THE USG ANALYSIS. HE SAID THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEM REMAINS THAT OF FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE VERIFICATION ISSUE WHICH IS POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE. HE STATED THAT VERIFICATION PROCEDURES MUST BE BASED UPON THE REDUCTION AGREEMENT ULTIMATELY REACHED.

2. ROTH DOUBTS WHETHER RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS REMAINING IN THE NGA AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE VERIFIED. HE BELIEVES THAT ONLY MOVEMENT INTO THE NGA SHOULD BE CONTROLLED. THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENT IN CHECKING FORCE MOVEMENTS WOULD BE PRE-NOTIFICATION. ROTH CHARACTERIZED PRE-NOTIFICATION AS THE KEY TO THE WHOLE SYSTEM. HE SAID THAT TROOP MOVEMENTS INTO THE NGA SHOULD BE ALLOWED ONLY AFTER NOTIFICATION HAD BEEN GIVEN. THEREFORE, ANY MOVEMENT NOTED WHICH WAS NOT THE SUBJECT OF PRE-NOTIFICATION WOULD AUTOMATICALLY BE A BREACH OF THE AGREEMENT.

3. ROTH SAID THE GERMANS WOULD ACCEPT INSPECTORS ON THE PERIPHERY OF THE NGA, BUT NOT THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE OF
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THE FRG'S TERRITORY. HE THEN REFERRED TO THE EASE OF MOVEMENT WHICH EASTERN INSPECTORS WOULD HAVE IN A DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY SUCH AS THE FRG SIMPLY BY DONNING CIVILIAN CLOTHES. HE SAID HE WOULD TALK ABOUT THE REQUIREMENT FOR SPECIFIC NUMBERS OF INSPECTORS WHEN IN WASHINGTON.

4. ROTH ALSO DISCUSSED THE UNDERLYING TENET OF ANY

VERIFICATION SYSTEM. HE SAID A 100 PERCENT VERIFICATION PROBABILITY WAS OBVIOUSLY NOT ACHIEVABLE. ROTH BELIEVES THAT A CONCENTRATED EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO DEVELOP A SYSTEM WHICH WOULD PROVIDE A "FAIR" CHANCE OF DISCOVERING BREACHES IN THE AGREEMENT. SUCH A SYSTEM MUST NECESSARILY INCREASE THE RISK OF CHEATING.

5. ROTH IS SENSITIVE THE NEED TO DESIGN A VERIFICATION SYSTEM WHICH FITS THE SPECIFICS OF THE CASE. HE WANTS TO AVOID THE PROBLEM OF OVERCONTROL. HE INDICATED THAT IF ONLY A FEW STATIC POSTS WERE ESTABLISHED ALONG THE PERIPHERY OF THE NGA, THEN PERHAPS THEY COULD BE SUPPLEMENTED BY A SERIES OF RANDOM CHECKS IN OTHER AREAS.

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6. ROTH REFERRED TO THE IMPORTANCE OF STATISTICS IN THE WHOLE VERIFICATION EXERCISE. HE CITED AIR TRAFFIC FLOW ANALYSES AS INDICATIVE OF A PATTERN WHICH, WHEN DEVIATIONS WERE NOTED, COULD BE A POSSIBLE WARNING THAT
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VIOLATIONS MIGHT BE OCCURRING. THUS, THROUGH THE USE OF STATISTICAL ANALYSES PLUS A SPOT CHECK SYSTEM, IT MIGHT PROVE FEASIBLE TO ESTABLISH A SATISFACTORY SYSTEM WHICH WOULD PREVENT CHEATING IN QUANTITY.

7. ROTH REFERRED TO THE POSSIBLE USEFULNESS OF A STANDING COMMISSION WHICH WOULD BE THE LOWEST LEVEL ORGANIZATION ESTABLISHED FOR VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH AN AGREEMENT. SUCH A COMMISSION MIGHT EXCHANGE DATA, INVESTIGATE COMPLAINTS, ETC. THE TYPE OF COMMISSION ROTH APPARENTLY HAS IN MIND SEEMS TO BE COMPARABLE TO THE SALT STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, EXCEPT THAT IT WOULD BE A MULTILATERAL BODY. ROTH PLANS TO DISCUSS THIS CONCEPT FURTHER IN WASHINGTON.

8. ROTH SAID HE DOES NOT WANT TO DELAY THE INTRODUCTION OF THE USG ANALYSIS INTO THE NATO WORKING GROUP. HE AGREED THAT THE USG COULD TABLE ITS ANALYSIS AT THE NEXT NATO WORKING GROUP MEETING.
HILLENBRAND

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